Covenant mutual liquidating trust Hollanda sex cams chat


25-Apr-2019 03:03

[Note 10] In January, 1993, Hanover's new president, Rupley, met with Sutton to discuss Sutton's being promoted to a position in Hanover's home office. Sutton testified that he did not tell Rupley that he was working on any outside insurance business or that he had formed SKA. [Note 12] The judge heard this motion on January 4, 1995, and scheduled the trial to begin on January 23, 1995. [Note 14] Hanover maintains that this order was prejudicial because count VI alleged that IPI and William J. Accordingly, we remand the case for discovery concerning events relevant to count VI (and VII, see infra section 6) from June 1 through December 31, 1994. He said he told Rupley that, in all fairness, Rupley should know that he had been talking with investment bankers about raising money for a potential new business opportunity. On January 23, 1995, the judge allowed Hanover's motion to continue the trial, setting it for February 6, 1995. O'Brien, Inc., interfered with Hanover's three-year nonsolicitation agreement with O'Brien, which did not expire until December 31, 1994. If warranted by such discovery, the trial judge shall set aside the verdict and grant a new trial on count VI. On January 19, 1995, the judge issued a protective order which governed the handling of all documents, testimony, and other information filed during discovery and other proceedings in the action. 1 , 11-12 (1983) ("an executive employee is barred from actively competing with his employer [during] the tenure of his employment, even in the absence of an express covenant"). Northington's intent, which was known to Sutton, was to acquire Covenant and then implement Sutton and Kittel's plan to establish a network of local property and casualty insurance companies. First, the judge may have been concerned (as the defendants argued in their emergency motion) that Hanover's complaint was an effort by a potential competitor to squelch competition and, therefore, any delay could cause irreparable harm to a start-up venture. On appeal, Hanover argues among other things that the reach of the protective order, at least as it related to expert witnesses, was error. On the fifth day of trial, the issue came up again. Specifically it claims error in the judge's refusal to instruct the jury that (1) notwithstanding the fact that an employee at-will can secretly prepare to compete with his employer, he cannot actively compete; and (2) an employee may not solicit the customers of his employer during his employment. Page 158 In furtherance of these ends, Grochmal met with the Connecticut Insurance Commissioner to discuss the possible acquisition. Moreover, as the defendants state, Hanover precipitated the speedy trial by demanding several forms of equitable relief in its complaint, including preliminary injunctions against the business activities of O'Brien, Sutton, and IPI. [Note 16] Hanover's counsel sought leave to show confidential material to expert witnesses if they were advised of the protective order. The judge allowed the experts to examine the material saying: "I have responsibilities to these people and I'm not going to keep them and their public responsibilities ad infinitum. Moreover, there was no harm to Hanover from the protective order as the judge ultimately permitted Hanover's expert witnesses to review the confidential information prior to testifying. On February 18, 1997, judgment entered in favor of Hanover on count III, on a finding that IPI violated G. Both Hanover and the defendants, Sutton, O'Brien, IPI, and William J. We address, in turn, the issues on appeal: (1) Hanover's contention that it was denied a fair trial because of an accelerated trial date, discovery restrictions, and an unfair protective order; (2) the judge's instructions to the jury on count I; (3) Sutton's liability to Hanover on count I for breach of fiduciary duty; (4) the judge's denial of a jury trial on damages after granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict on count I; (5) IPI's liability to Hanover on count III for engaging in practices that violated G. Hanover Metro, Inc., Hanover's second largest operating company, was a full-service operation which was responsible for New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and what Hanover deemed "down state New York." After Sutton's mentor and personal friend, O'Brien, resigned from Hanover, Sutton began considering his professional future. [Note 6] On May 9, 1996, judgment entered for the plaintiff on counts I and V and for the defendants on all the remaining counts except count III which was reserved pending a hearing on attorneys' fees. The judge awarded Hanover

[Note 10] In January, 1993, Hanover's new president, Rupley, met with Sutton to discuss Sutton's being promoted to a position in Hanover's home office. Sutton testified that he did not tell Rupley that he was working on any outside insurance business or that he had formed SKA. [Note 12] The judge heard this motion on January 4, 1995, and scheduled the trial to begin on January 23, 1995. [Note 14] Hanover maintains that this order was prejudicial because count VI alleged that IPI and William J. Accordingly, we remand the case for discovery concerning events relevant to count VI (and VII, see infra section 6) from June 1 through December 31, 1994. He said he told Rupley that, in all fairness, Rupley should know that he had been talking with investment bankers about raising money for a potential new business opportunity. On January 23, 1995, the judge allowed Hanover's motion to continue the trial, setting it for February 6, 1995. O'Brien, Inc., interfered with Hanover's three-year nonsolicitation agreement with O'Brien, which did not expire until December 31, 1994. If warranted by such discovery, the trial judge shall set aside the verdict and grant a new trial on count VI. On January 19, 1995, the judge issued a protective order which governed the handling of all documents, testimony, and other information filed during discovery and other proceedings in the action. 1 , 11-12 (1983) ("an executive employee is barred from actively competing with his employer [during] the tenure of his employment, even in the absence of an express covenant"). Northington's intent, which was known to Sutton, was to acquire Covenant and then implement Sutton and Kittel's plan to establish a network of local property and casualty insurance companies. First, the judge may have been concerned (as the defendants argued in their emergency motion) that Hanover's complaint was an effort by a potential competitor to squelch competition and, therefore, any delay could cause irreparable harm to a start-up venture. On appeal, Hanover argues among other things that the reach of the protective order, at least as it related to expert witnesses, was error. On the fifth day of trial, the issue came up again. Specifically it claims error in the judge's refusal to instruct the jury that (1) notwithstanding the fact that an employee at-will can secretly prepare to compete with his employer, he cannot actively compete; and (2) an employee may not solicit the customers of his employer during his employment. Page 158 In furtherance of these ends, Grochmal met with the Connecticut Insurance Commissioner to discuss the possible acquisition. Moreover, as the defendants state, Hanover precipitated the speedy trial by demanding several forms of equitable relief in its complaint, including preliminary injunctions against the business activities of O'Brien, Sutton, and IPI. [Note 16] Hanover's counsel sought leave to show confidential material to expert witnesses if they were advised of the protective order. The judge allowed the experts to examine the material saying: "I have responsibilities to these people and I'm not going to keep them and their public responsibilities ad infinitum. Moreover, there was no harm to Hanover from the protective order as the judge ultimately permitted Hanover's expert witnesses to review the confidential information prior to testifying. On February 18, 1997, judgment entered in favor of Hanover on count III, on a finding that IPI violated G. Both Hanover and the defendants, Sutton, O'Brien, IPI, and William J. We address, in turn, the issues on appeal: (1) Hanover's contention that it was denied a fair trial because of an accelerated trial date, discovery restrictions, and an unfair protective order; (2) the judge's instructions to the jury on count I; (3) Sutton's liability to Hanover on count I for breach of fiduciary duty; (4) the judge's denial of a jury trial on damages after granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict on count I; (5) IPI's liability to Hanover on count III for engaging in practices that violated G. Hanover Metro, Inc., Hanover's second largest operating company, was a full-service operation which was responsible for New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and what Hanover deemed "down state New York." After Sutton's mentor and personal friend, O'Brien, resigned from Hanover, Sutton began considering his professional future. [Note 6] On May 9, 1996, judgment entered for the plaintiff on counts I and V and for the defendants on all the remaining counts except count III which was reserved pending a hearing on attorneys' fees. The judge awarded Hanover $1.00 in nominal damages and $168,154.04 in attorneys' fees and costs. 93A; (6) Hanover's contention that the judge erred in finding only nominal damages on count III; (7) the award of attorneys' fees on count III; (8) Sutton's liability to Hanover on count V for loss of corporate opportunity; and (9) the adequacy of the judge's findings of fact and conclusions of law on count VII. The agreement stated in part: "For the period January 1, 1992 through December 31, 1994 (the "Consultation Period"), you agree to be available to provide consulting, advisory and related services to Hanover and/or its subsidiaries as may be reasonably requested from time to time by the Chairman of the Hanover Board of Directors . In May, 1990, O'Brien appointed Sutton president of a local operating company called Hanover Metro, Inc., in New Jersey. In return for these licenses and the charter, IPI will contribute $1 million and 1% of its common stock to the Liquidating Trust established by the Connecticut Insurance Department for disposal of the liabilities of Covenant. The protective order was issued as an exercise of the judge's discretion to protect the defendants from Hanover's request for information regarding their development of business contacts and other competitively sensitive documents.

||

[Note 10] In January, 1993, Hanover's new president, Rupley, met with Sutton to discuss Sutton's being promoted to a position in Hanover's home office. Sutton testified that he did not tell Rupley that he was working on any outside insurance business or that he had formed SKA. [Note 12] The judge heard this motion on January 4, 1995, and scheduled the trial to begin on January 23, 1995. [Note 14] Hanover maintains that this order was prejudicial because count VI alleged that IPI and William J. Accordingly, we remand the case for discovery concerning events relevant to count VI (and VII, see infra section 6) from June 1 through December 31, 1994.

.00 in nominal damages and 8,154.04 in attorneys' fees and costs. 93A; (6) Hanover's contention that the judge erred in finding only nominal damages on count III; (7) the award of attorneys' fees on count III; (8) Sutton's liability to Hanover on count V for loss of corporate opportunity; and (9) the adequacy of the judge's findings of fact and conclusions of law on count VII. The agreement stated in part: "For the period January 1, 1992 through December 31, 1994 (the "Consultation Period"), you agree to be available to provide consulting, advisory and related services to Hanover and/or its subsidiaries as may be reasonably requested from time to time by the Chairman of the Hanover Board of Directors . In May, 1990, O'Brien appointed Sutton president of a local operating company called Hanover Metro, Inc., in New Jersey. In return for these licenses and the charter, IPI will contribute

[Note 10] In January, 1993, Hanover's new president, Rupley, met with Sutton to discuss Sutton's being promoted to a position in Hanover's home office. Sutton testified that he did not tell Rupley that he was working on any outside insurance business or that he had formed SKA. [Note 12] The judge heard this motion on January 4, 1995, and scheduled the trial to begin on January 23, 1995. [Note 14] Hanover maintains that this order was prejudicial because count VI alleged that IPI and William J. Accordingly, we remand the case for discovery concerning events relevant to count VI (and VII, see infra section 6) from June 1 through December 31, 1994. He said he told Rupley that, in all fairness, Rupley should know that he had been talking with investment bankers about raising money for a potential new business opportunity. On January 23, 1995, the judge allowed Hanover's motion to continue the trial, setting it for February 6, 1995. O'Brien, Inc., interfered with Hanover's three-year nonsolicitation agreement with O'Brien, which did not expire until December 31, 1994. If warranted by such discovery, the trial judge shall set aside the verdict and grant a new trial on count VI. On January 19, 1995, the judge issued a protective order which governed the handling of all documents, testimony, and other information filed during discovery and other proceedings in the action. 1 , 11-12 (1983) ("an executive employee is barred from actively competing with his employer [during] the tenure of his employment, even in the absence of an express covenant"). Northington's intent, which was known to Sutton, was to acquire Covenant and then implement Sutton and Kittel's plan to establish a network of local property and casualty insurance companies. First, the judge may have been concerned (as the defendants argued in their emergency motion) that Hanover's complaint was an effort by a potential competitor to squelch competition and, therefore, any delay could cause irreparable harm to a start-up venture. On appeal, Hanover argues among other things that the reach of the protective order, at least as it related to expert witnesses, was error. On the fifth day of trial, the issue came up again. Specifically it claims error in the judge's refusal to instruct the jury that (1) notwithstanding the fact that an employee at-will can secretly prepare to compete with his employer, he cannot actively compete; and (2) an employee may not solicit the customers of his employer during his employment. Page 158 In furtherance of these ends, Grochmal met with the Connecticut Insurance Commissioner to discuss the possible acquisition. Moreover, as the defendants state, Hanover precipitated the speedy trial by demanding several forms of equitable relief in its complaint, including preliminary injunctions against the business activities of O'Brien, Sutton, and IPI. [Note 16] Hanover's counsel sought leave to show confidential material to expert witnesses if they were advised of the protective order. The judge allowed the experts to examine the material saying: "I have responsibilities to these people and I'm not going to keep them and their public responsibilities ad infinitum. Moreover, there was no harm to Hanover from the protective order as the judge ultimately permitted Hanover's expert witnesses to review the confidential information prior to testifying. On February 18, 1997, judgment entered in favor of Hanover on count III, on a finding that IPI violated G. Both Hanover and the defendants, Sutton, O'Brien, IPI, and William J. We address, in turn, the issues on appeal: (1) Hanover's contention that it was denied a fair trial because of an accelerated trial date, discovery restrictions, and an unfair protective order; (2) the judge's instructions to the jury on count I; (3) Sutton's liability to Hanover on count I for breach of fiduciary duty; (4) the judge's denial of a jury trial on damages after granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict on count I; (5) IPI's liability to Hanover on count III for engaging in practices that violated G. Hanover Metro, Inc., Hanover's second largest operating company, was a full-service operation which was responsible for New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and what Hanover deemed "down state New York." After Sutton's mentor and personal friend, O'Brien, resigned from Hanover, Sutton began considering his professional future. [Note 6] On May 9, 1996, judgment entered for the plaintiff on counts I and V and for the defendants on all the remaining counts except count III which was reserved pending a hearing on attorneys' fees. The judge awarded Hanover $1.00 in nominal damages and $168,154.04 in attorneys' fees and costs. 93A; (6) Hanover's contention that the judge erred in finding only nominal damages on count III; (7) the award of attorneys' fees on count III; (8) Sutton's liability to Hanover on count V for loss of corporate opportunity; and (9) the adequacy of the judge's findings of fact and conclusions of law on count VII. The agreement stated in part: "For the period January 1, 1992 through December 31, 1994 (the "Consultation Period"), you agree to be available to provide consulting, advisory and related services to Hanover and/or its subsidiaries as may be reasonably requested from time to time by the Chairman of the Hanover Board of Directors . In May, 1990, O'Brien appointed Sutton president of a local operating company called Hanover Metro, Inc., in New Jersey. In return for these licenses and the charter, IPI will contribute $1 million and 1% of its common stock to the Liquidating Trust established by the Connecticut Insurance Department for disposal of the liabilities of Covenant. The protective order was issued as an exercise of the judge's discretion to protect the defendants from Hanover's request for information regarding their development of business contacts and other competitively sensitive documents.

||

[Note 10] In January, 1993, Hanover's new president, Rupley, met with Sutton to discuss Sutton's being promoted to a position in Hanover's home office. Sutton testified that he did not tell Rupley that he was working on any outside insurance business or that he had formed SKA. [Note 12] The judge heard this motion on January 4, 1995, and scheduled the trial to begin on January 23, 1995. [Note 14] Hanover maintains that this order was prejudicial because count VI alleged that IPI and William J. Accordingly, we remand the case for discovery concerning events relevant to count VI (and VII, see infra section 6) from June 1 through December 31, 1994.

million and 1% of its common stock to the Liquidating Trust established by the Connecticut Insurance Department for disposal of the liabilities of Covenant. The protective order was issued as an exercise of the judge's discretion to protect the defendants from Hanover's request for information regarding their development of business contacts and other competitively sensitive documents.

[160-162] At the trial of a civil action, there was no error in the judge's protective order limiting the disclosure of certain confidential materials. In a civil action in which the plaintiff sought, inter alia, declaratory relief with respect to a breach of fiduciary duty, there was no error in the judge's grant of relief by imposition of a constructive trust on one of the defendants who had improperly diverted a business opportunity for his own benefit and to the detriment of the plaintiff. The motion was allowed as to count I based on Sutton's breach of his duty to disclose a corporate opportunity. After reviewing the plan, Northington embarked on an effort to raise funds for the venture. The judge instructed as follows: "I have outlined on that board the four elements of the claim and those elements are: duty, and breach, and damage, and causation. [178-179] CIVIL ACTION commenced in the Superior Court Department on December 16, 1994. Roseman, J., and a motion for a new trial was considered by him. On December 16, 1994, the plaintiff, Hanover Insurance Company (Hanover), filed an eight-count complaint against the defendants, John Sutton, William J. [Note 4] Before the case went to the jury, Hanover amended its complaint to add three additional counts. Sutton and Kittel approached Joseph Grochmal, a principal of Northington Partners, Inc.